Private Armies In Philppines

Guns and goons

Jan 7th 2010 | MANILA
From The Economist print edition

It is hard to imagine Philippine politics without them

AFP

Just a little private enterprise

WITH national and local elections scheduled in the Philippines for May, an independent commission was due to begin work on January 7th on disbanding politicians’ private armies before then. The government appointed the commission after public outrage over the massacre of 57 people in the southern province of Maguindanao in November. The authorities accused a local politician and his armed followers of the crime—a charge the politician has denied in court.
Norberto Gonzales, the defence secretary, says there are 132 private armed groups led by politicians in various parts of the country, with a combined strength of about 10,000 armed men. Critics doubt that the commission can complete its task in time. Successive governments that might have disbanded these armed groups have failed to do so—mainly because they have benefited from their existence.
Sometimes, private armies augment the official security forces, and help defend communities threatened by communist or Muslim separatist guerrillas. Almost always, they keep local politicians in power by intimidating rivals and voters. Local warlords also use the threat of violence to ensure the election of politicians at the national level—usually those already in government or most likely to form the next government. National politicians return the favour by providing patronage to the warlords and turning a blind eye to the behaviour of their private armies.
An example is the political clan accused of the killings in Maguindanao. The clan was allied to the president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo—at least until the massacre, when the governing party swiftly ended the alliance. The clan has (or used to have) several hundred armed followers. Many belonged to an officially approved militia supposed to support the security forces, and had government-issue weapons.
The commission will first have to decide what exactly constitutes a private army. Many politicians travel with large parties of official or private bodyguards. Some own licensed security-guard companies. The rank-and-file of private armies are often members of official police or military auxiliary forces.
Once the commission has decided which armed groups to disband, it can then do no more than recommend how to go about it. The police or the official army will have to do the actual work. Yet some armies (such as that in Maguindanao) are in cahoots with the police or the army. The commission’s critics suspect that armed groups will be disbanded selectively. The governing party’s presidential candidate is far behind opposition candidates in the opinion polls and Mrs Arroyo cannot run for president again. So the suspicion is that the armies of her allies are for the chop, but those belonging to her opponents will be allowed to soldier on.
The commission comprises a judge, police officer, and army officer (all retired), a broadcaster, a Catholic bishop, an Islamic scholar and an anti-crime campaigner. One member acknowledges that it will take political will to do in four months what previous governments have never seriously tried. And the will might be hard to find in a system where political power often comes out of the barrel of a gun.